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ABSTRACT
In passing the Communications Decency Act of 1996
(CDA), Congress sought to promote and protect the everevolving free market of voices and ideas available on the
internet. In order to reach this end, section 230(c) of the
CDA extends protection from liability to those who provide
a means for disseminating speech on the web, dubbed by
the statute as “interactive computer service providers”
(ICSP). Section 230 protects ICSPs from liability for harm
inflicted by content created and posted by third parties on
their respective forums. This Article focuses on a 2015
Washington State Supreme Court decision, J.S. v. Village
Voice Media Holdings, LLC., which raised the troubling
prospect that content requirements prohibiting illegal or
immoral activities, could potentially remove an ICSP from
Section 230’s immunity in the state of Washington.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
The Internet has become the primary means for the
dissemination and consumption of information in the technological
age. Anticipating these developments, Congress sought to
“preserve the vibrant and competitive free market”1 of ideas and
information available on the Internet by enacting Section 230(c) of
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”). Section
230(c) of the CDA grants immunity to “interactive computer
service providers” (“ICSPs”) from civil liability for content posted
by third-party “information content providers” (“ICPs”).2 Courts
have construed and applied the immunity provisions within Section
230 of the CDA broadly in cases arising from content posted by
ICSP users.3 However, in J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings,
1

47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2) (1996)
47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996)
3
See, e.g., Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir.2008); Green
v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir.3003); Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir.2003).
2
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LLC. (“Village Voice”), the Washington State Supreme Court
refused to extend Section 230’s immunity to the defendant, Village
Voice Media Holdings, LLC., doing business as “backpage.com”
(Backpage), in a case arising out of advertisements posted on its
website by a third party. The court allowed the claim to survive
Backpage’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted based on the plaintiff’s allegations that
Backpage’s “content requirements” somehow played a “substantial
role in creating the content” in the advertisements at issue.4
This Article begins by explaining the immunity provision
in Section 230 of the CDA, reviewing the provision’s purpose, and
providing an account of how courts have interpreted the provision.
The Article will continue by recommending a test used by some
courts to determine if an ICSP has “developed” content under the
CDA, thereby forfeiting immunity. Next, it will analyze the facts,
holding, and opinions of the Village Voice case to examine the
legal and logical fallacies in the majority opinion. The Article will
conclude by discussing the potential policy consequences of the
holding in Village Voice and the negative consequences it bodes
for ICSPs in Washington.
I.

EXPLANATION OF SECTION 230

Section 230(c) provides ICSPs with immunity from state
law civil liability for damages arising out of content that they do
not produce, but merely host. In enacting this provision, Congress
sought to foster the development of Internet-based communication,
and to encourage service providers to self-regulate without fear of
being held liable for content provided by third parties.5 Courts
construe the immunity provision of the CDA broadly and extend
immunity to ICSPs wherever they have not generated the content
at issue.6
4

J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC., 184 Wash.2d 95, 103 (2015).
See e.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir.1997).
6
Id.
5
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A. How the CDA Works
ICSPs and ICPs are distinguished by their relation to the
content at issue in any given case. The CDA defines ICSPs as “any
information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server.”7 ICPs are defined in the CDA as “any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the internet or any
other interactive computer service.”8 Thus, an ICSP could be an
ICP as well if it plays any material role in developing the content
in question.
Section 230(c) provides immunity from civil liability for
ICSPs from claims that arise out of content posted by third-party
users, ICPs. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) provides that “[n]o provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) provides, in
relevant part, that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section.” Together, these two subsections
have been read by courts to stand for the principle that Section
230(c)(1) of the CDA “protects from liability (1) a provider or user
of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to
treat, under a state law cause of action, as publisher or speaker (3)
of information provided by” a third party.9

7

47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (emphasis added).
9
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2009).
8
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B. Policy Underlying the CDA
Congress had two purposes in offering immunity under the
CDA: (1) to generally promote the expansion of the free
marketplace of ideas and innovations presented by the Internet and
(2) to remove the disincentive for ICSPs to self-regulate posed by
state-law causes of action.10
In enacting Section 230, Congress intended in part to facilitate
the growth of the Internet as the predominant source for the
dissemination and procurement of information and ideas. In
passing Section 230, Congress explicitly made clear its intention of
“promot[ing] the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media.”11
Additionally, Congress explained, Section 230 is designed, at least
in part, to “preserve the vibrant and competitive free market” of
ideas that is presented by the Internet.12
Section 230 was also intended to remove disincentives for
service providers to “self-regulate the dissemination of offensive
material over their services.”13 In so doing, Congress was
responding to a New York trial court decision14 holding an ICSP
liable for third-party statements because it exercised editorial
control over the content posted by its users. The court found that
the defendant Prodigy constituted a publisher under state law
because it had deleted some messages on its message boards on the
basis of offensiveness and bad taste.15 As a result, Prodigy was
held legally responsible for the defamatory messages that it had
failed to delete under the theory that the ICSP had undertaken an
editorial role and so was subsequently responsible for any and all
content displayed on its site.16 The decision in Stratton Oakmont
10

28 U.S.C. § 230 (b).
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).
12
47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2).
13
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir.1997).
14
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (unpublished).
15
Id. at 3.
16
Id. at 4.
11
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made clear that where an ICSP exercised editorial control over
third-party posts, it could be held liable for the content of those
posts. Concerned that Stratton Oakmont decision would provide a
disincentive for ICSPs to exert any control over third-party
content, Congress included the immunity provision in Section 230
in the CDA.17
C. How Courts Apply the CDA
Consistent with the policy underlying the CDA, courts have
consistently construed the immunity provisions in Section 230
expansively “in all cases arising from the publication of usergenerated content.”18 Courts read the language in Section 230(c) as
providing ICSPs with immunity that is “quite robust.”19 Courts
“apply an expansive definition of ‘interactive computer service
provider’ and a rather restrictive definition of ‘information content
provider.’”20 In light of Congress’s noted concerns ICSPs qualify
for immunity from liability, so long as they do not also function as
an ICP, by producing content for the portion of the statement or
publication at issue.21 Close cases “must be resolved in favor of
immunity, lest we cut the heart out of Section 230 by forcing
websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off
claims that they promoted or encouraged—or at least tacitly
assented to—the illegality of third parties.”22

17

Congressional intent to override such a disincentive can be found in 47
U.S.C. § 230(b)(4); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (stating “§ 230 responded to
a New York state court decision, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.,
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. May 24, 1995)”).
18
Myspace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
19
J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC., 184 Wash.2d 95, 122 (2015)
(citing Carafano, 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003)) (dissent).
20
Id.
21
Carafano, 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003).
22
Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 408
(6th Cir. 2014) (citing Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157 (9th Cir. 2008)).

2016]

THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT IN VILLAGE VOICE

II.

83

MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TEST

In Village Voice, the court held that Backpage would be
liable for third-party advertisements if plaintiffs could show that
Backpage’s policies somehow helped develop those
advertisements. Like many other cases involving Section 230
immunity, Village Voice hinges on the breadth afforded to the
word “development” in Section 230(f)(3)’s definition of ICP. As
previously discussed, Section 230(c) provides that “no provider or
user of an [ICSP] shall be treated as the publisher or speaker” of
content posted by an ICP. Section 230(f)(3) further defines an ICP
as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for
the creation or development of information provided through the
Internet” (emphasis added). As such, unless a person develops
content, that individual cannot be held liable for damages arising
from that content under the CDA.
In order to determine whether an ICSP has “developed”
content in a given case, a few courts have adopted the “material
contribution” test.23 In Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 24 Hill sued StubHub
for participating in the sale of tickets for more than $3.00 over face
value; an action considered an unfair and deceptive trade practice
under North Carolina state law. Hill argued that StubHub was
participating in a civil conspiracy, along with those who sold
tickets on its website for excessive profits.25 The trial court granted
Hill’s motion for summary judgment against StubHub, finding that
StubHub’s conduct constituted an unfair and deceptive trade
practice.26
StubHub appealed, arguing that the suit should have been
dismissed on the grounds that, as an ICSP, Section 230 provided it
with immunity.27 The court agreed and found that plaintiff’s claims
23

See e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398
(6th Cir. 2014); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157; Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727
S.E.2d 550; 219 N.C.App. 227 (N.C. App. 2012).
24
Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 553.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 555.
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were barred by Section 230(c).28 For an ICSP to forfeit immunity,
the court held, it must materially contribute to the unlawful
content.29 The court explained that “in order to ‘materially
contribute’ to the creation of unlawful material, a website must
effectively control the content posted by third parties or take other
actions which essentially ensure the creation of unlawful
material.”30
As a result, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that
StubHub could not be found to have materially contributed to the
unlawful content, simply because it had not taken steps to ensure
that unlawful content would be posted.31 Even if StubHub had
encouraged sellers on its website to sell at prices higher than $3.00
over their face value—or had been aware of the risk that tickets
sold on its website would exceed face value by over $3.00—the
court reasoned that it still would not have been enough to find that
it materially contributed to the unlawful content as an ICSP.32
In deciding Village Voice, the Washington Supreme Court
should have applied the material contributions test. Had the court
applied the test, it would have held that Backpage neither
effectively controlled the illegal content posted by third parties, nor
took actions to ensure the creation of illegal content.
III.

THE VILLAGE VOICE CASE

In Village Voice, the Washington Supreme Court allowed
plaintiffs’ claims to survive a motion to dismiss, holding that their
allegations of Backpage’s involvement in their claims were
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Advertisements featuring plaintiffs—three minor girls, J.S.,
S.L., and L.C. (collectively referred to as J.S.)—had purportedly
been posted on Backpage.33 J.S. was allegedly raped multiple times
28

Id. at 561.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 98 (2015).
29
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by adult customers who responded to the advertisements.34
However,
Backpage’s
content
requirements
prohibited
“advertisements on its website to contain naked images, images
featuring transparent clothing, sexually explicit language,
suggestions of an exchange of sex acts for money, or
advertisements for illegal services.”35 Backpage held additional
requirements for content posted in the ‘escort’ section of its
website. Backpage’s requirements at the time read: “Backpage
does not allow ‘any solicitation . . . for any illegal service
exchanging sexual favors for money or other valuable
consideration,’ ‘any material on the Site that exploits minors in any
way,’ or ‘any material … that in any way constitutes or assists in
human trafficking.’”36
The advertisements featuring J.S. were posted on
Backpage’s website without any guidance from Backpage
personnel. J.S. conceded that all of the advertisements featuring
J.S. complied with Backpage’s content requirements.37 However,
J.S. alleged that, by setting content requirements that prohibited
sex trafficking, Backpage had helped pimps and prostitutes evade
law enforcement by giving the appearance of lawful activity on
Backpage’s site. As a result, J.S. alleged, Backpage had materially
contributed to the development of the content at issue.
Backpage moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that Section
230(c) provided it with immunity because it had not contributed to
the development of the advertisements at issue. The court found
that the plaintiffs could overcome the motion to dismiss because
the they had pled facts sufficient to bring an action against
Backpage.
A. Procedural Posture/CR 12(b)(6)
The Village Voice case made its way to the Washington
State Supreme Court on direct appeal from a trial court’s denial of
34

Id.
Id.
36
Id.
37
Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 98 (2015).
35
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Backpage’s motion to dismiss. J.S. made state law claims for
“negligence, outrage, sexual exploitation of children,
ratification/vicarious liability, unjust enrichment, invasion of
privacy, sexual assault and battery, and civil conspiracy.”38 In
response to these claims, Backpage filed a CR 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss the suit on the grounds that J.S.’s claims were preempted
by Section 230(c) of the CDA. Backpage argued that it could not
be held liable for J.S.’s damages because it did not play a role in
producing the advertisements at issue. Because the CDA
immunizes ICSPs that take no part in creating content from
liability arising therefrom, Backpage could not be held liable for
the damages arising out of advertisements wholly designed and
produced by a third party.
When courts in Washington review CR 12(b)(6) motions,
they “accept as true the allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint and
any reasonable inferences therein.”39 In response to Backpage’s
motion, J.S. argued that Backpage played a substantial role in
contributing to the content of the advertisements at issue, and
therefore CDA immunity did not apply.40
B. Opinions
The majority opinion in Village Voice, authored by Justice
Steven C. González, held that dismissal of J.S.’s claims under CR
12(b)(6) would not be appropriate, based on J.S.’s allegations.41
J.S. claimed that “Backpage.com [knew] the foregoing content
requirements [were] a fraud and a ruse [] aimed at helping pimps,
prostitutes, and Backpage.com to continue to evade law
enforcement by giving the [false] appearance that [it did] not allow

38

Id.
Id. at 100 (citing Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wash.2d 195, 20 (1998).
40
Id. at 103.
41
In Washington, courts allow claims to be brought, unless it appears
“beyond a reasonable doubt that no facts exist that would justify recovery.” In
re Parentage of C.M.F., 179 Wash.2d 411, 418; 314 P.3d 1109 (2013)
(emphasis added).
39
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sex trafficking on its website.”42 Because of this, they argued,
“Backpage [had] a ‘substantial role in creating the content . . . of
the advertisements on its website.’”43 Taking as true the plaintiffs’
allegations that the content requirements were “specifically
designed . . . so that pimps can continue to use Backpage.com to
traffic in sex,”44 the court determined that the case could proceed
and held that the
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sheryl Gordon McCloud
concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims could not overcome Section
230(c) in this case because “Backpage did not materially
contribute to the development or creation of the content at issue.”45
Justice Gordon McCloud pointed out that courts interpreting the
Section 230 of the CDA have read the provision as providing “full
immunity” for ICSPs in cases where a third party “willingly
provides the essential published content,” regardless of the editing
or selection process.46 She also criticized the reasoning of the
majority and concurrence’s misapplication of a Ninth Circuit
holding involving an ICSP’s material contribution to unlawful
content on its website.47 Ultimately, Justice Gordon McCloud held
that the CDA should have preempted the case brought by plaintiffs
for the simple reason that “J.S.’s complaint clearly alleges that
another content provider, not Backpage, provided the content for
the advertisements.”48

42

Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 102 (2015).
Id. at 102-03.
44
Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 103 (2015).
45
Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 136 (2015) (dissent).
46
Id. at 122 (quoting Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d
1090, 1098-99, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
47
Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 131 (2015) (dissent).
48
Id. at 116.
43
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IV.

THE COURT’S MISAPPLICATION OF THE CDA

This case was wrongly decided. The Court reached the
conclusion that “it does not appear ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that
no facts exist that would justify recovery.’”49 This conclusion was
based on a mistaken interpretation of a landmark Ninth Circuit
case interpreting the CDA, and reliance on a mistaken legal
conclusion.
A. The Misreading of Roommates
The majority and concurrence both read the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Fair House Council v. Roommates.com, LLC,50 as
support for the proposition that setting content requirements that
induce unlawful advertisements creates a material contribution to
said ads.51 However, the facts and reasoning in Roommates
significantly distinguish it from the case at hand.
Roommates.com was a website “designed to match people
renting out spare rooms with people looking for a place to live.”52
The site required users to answer questions about gender, sexual
orientation, and whether they would bring children into the
household by selecting from pre-written answer choices in dropdown menus.53 Because of this practice, Roomates.com was sued
by two housing groups who argued that the site was renting
housing based on discriminatory criteria in violation of the federal
Fair Housing Act (FHA) and California state law.54
Roommates.com asserted Section 230 immunity. However,
the Ninth Circuit found that Roommates.com had contributed
materially to the illegal conduct because it had written questions
aimed at prompting discriminatory preferences, required users to
answer them, and provided the user with a list of answer choices
49

Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 103 (2015).
521 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008).
51
Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95 (2015).
52
521 F.3d at 1161.
53
Id. at 1164.
54
Id. at 1162.
50

2016]

THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT IN VILLAGE VOICE

89

that it had created.55
The Village Voice Court misread the holding of Roommates
in holding that Backpage could have forfeited immunity by
intentionally setting policy requirements that encouraged or
induced illegal activity. In Roommates, the court held that
Roommates.com had forfeited liability where it had required users
to submit unlawful answers to unlawful questions, both of which it
had created. In contrast, Backpage maintained a policy against a
certain type of unlawful content. Regardless of whether
Backpage’s policies were set deceptively—which this Article
discusses later—Roommates does not provide that setting policies
against unlawful content invites liability as a material contribution
to content developed by third parties.
B. Mistaken Legal Conclusion
The Village Voice court held that plaintiffs’ assertions that
Backpage’s rules encouraged unlawful content, if true, could
justify recovery in spite of Section 230. However, previous courts
have made clear that such immunity is not eliminated, even where
ICSPs do induce illegal content. “[T]he fact that a website acted in
such a manner as to encourage the publication of unlawful material
does not preclude a finding of immunity pursuant to [Section]
230.”56 Even if Backpage had developed its content requirements
for the purposes of allowing users to evade law enforcement,
Section 230 immunity would still apply.
C. Applying the Material Contribution Test to Village Voice
Wider application of the material contributions test would
simplify Section 230 analysis and ensure broader compliance with
Section 230. In Village Voice, the Washington Supreme Court
should have applied the material contribution test. Under this test,
55

Id. at 1164.
Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 560 (N.C. App. 2012); See also
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 414 (6th Cir.
2014) (declining to follow an “encouragement” theory of liability).
56

90

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 12:1

Backpage could not be found to have materially contributed to the
advertisements at issue because it neither controlled the content
posted by third parties nor ensured the creation of unlawful
content. Similar to StubHub, even if Backpage had used its policy
requirements to encourage the advertisements, or known of the risk
of these sorts of ads, it still could not be said to have materially
contributed to their content.
In several respects, the facts of StubHub closely resemble
those in Village Voice. Backpage users were able to use the site to
display advertisements, similar to StubHub.57 Many advertisers
used the site to break Washington state laws by advertising for the
sexual assault and abuse of minors.58 However, Backpage had a
policy against doing exactly what the advertisers did. And, because
J.S. successfully argued that those policies somehow helped
advertisers, the Washington Supreme Court held that Backpage
had forfeited Section 230(c) immunity.59
An analogy to StubHub might be if StubHub had a policy
against North Carolina sellers advertising the tickets for more than
$3.00 over their face value, but sellers continued to do so anyway.
Under the reasoning in Village Voice, if plaintiffs argued that
StubHub’s policies somehow helped sellers break the law, it would
then forfeit Section 230 immunity. This result runs contrary to the
purpose of Section 230.
The Washington Supreme Court should have applied the
material contribution test for an accurate application of Section
230. Under the material contribution test, it would have found that:
(1) Backpage did not effectively control the content posted by third
parties, nor (2) did it ensure the creation of unlawful content.
First, Backpage had minimal control of the advertisements
posted by third parties. At most, the site asserted some control by
prohibiting certain illegal content in advertisements.60 Further,
plaintiffs admitted that Backpage provided no guidance

57

Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, at 98.
Id.
59
Id. at 101-03.
60
Id. at 99.
58
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whatsoever to the third-party advertisers.61
Second, Backpage did not ensure the creation of unlawful
content. Backpage had a policy against the sort of illegal content
posted by third parties. A failure to enforce this policy does not
forfeit immunity. To hold otherwise would go against the very
purpose of the CDA.62
V.

POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF VILLAGE VOICE

The court’s decision in Village Voice turns Section 230 on
its head by allowing a claim against an ICSP for the very activity
that Congress sought to protect. Section 230 was intended to
encourage ICSPs to self-regulate by protecting them from state-law
causes of action, which might allege that such actions constitute
playing the role of “publisher.”63 Nevertheless, the case at issue
involves a plaintiff bringing suit against an ICSP for engaging in
the very sort of self-governance referenced in the statute. As a
result, the outcome of Village Voice puts other ICSPs in an
uncertain position with regard to Section 230 protections in
Washington.
The Village Voice decision erred primarily by suggesting
that an ICSP's decision to police its website for illegal activity
could leave it open to liability. The outcome of this case hinged on
Backpage’s policy of “not allow[ing] . . . suggestions of an
exchange of sex acts for money, or advertisements for illegal
61

Id. at 99 (“J.S. allegedly was featured in Backpage advertisements posted
in accordance with instructions on Backpage’s website without any special
guidance from Backpage personnel.”) (emphasis added).
62
See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (1997) (“The
amount of information communicated via [ICSPs] is therefore staggering. The
specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious
chilling effect. It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of
their millions of postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for
each message republished by their services, interactive computer service
providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages
posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and
chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.”).
63
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
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services.”64 In 2011, Washington State Attorney General Rob
McKenna, along with more than forty other attorneys general
across the country, sent a letter to Backpage's counsel, demanding
that the site actively enforce its aforementioned content policies.65
The policies on which the court’s decision rested, were the same
policies that Backpage was being pressed to enforce less than five
years prior to the decision.
This case allows a plaintiff who is able to allege a
connection between the tortious or illegal conduct of a third party
and content policies of an ICSP to sustain a claim for damages. J.S.
was able to overcome Section 230 immunity by merely alleging
that Backpage, through its content requirements, contributed to the
development of content posted by third parties on its website.66
Accordingly, if Washington state courts interpret Section 230
consistent with Village Voice, plaintiffs will be able to overcome
immunity by simply pleading that a defendant-ICSP’s content
requirements provided an environment in which tortious conduct
could occur.
An example might be where an ICSP maintains a
prohibition against slander on its website. If a plaintiff alleged that
this prohibition was a fraud, intended to provide plausible
deniability in regard to the slanderous actions of third parties, that
ICSP could be sued for damages arising out of a third party’s
tortious conduct. This seems a troubling proposition for ICSPs who
hope to maintain a website free from tortious and illegal activity,
while also avoiding liability if such activity were to go undetected
or unremoved. In order to avoid liability under such a theory, it
seems that ICSPs should be advised to refrain from maintaining
any sort of protective content requirements lest they be held liable,
or at the very least dragged into court, for content posted by third
parties. To allow these sorts of cases to proceed to trial in the face
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of Section 230 immunity is to misinterpret the law. This
misinterpretation could have one of two consequences. For one,
many Washington ICSPs could halt their business activities in
Washington State, fearing lawsuits arising out of third-party
content in Washington courts. This would cause a lack of access to
online services on which many Washington citizens have grown
dependent. As another consequence, Washington ICSPs may read
this opinion as instructing them to abstain from holding policies
relating to third-party content. Either outcome runs contrary to the
policy stated in the CDA.
CONCLUSION
Section 230 was intended to prevent ICSPs from being
sued for harm caused by third parties.
Village
Voice
involved an ICSP that was sued for damages inflicted by a third
party.
The CDA should have barred the plaintiffs’ claims in
Village Voice because they arose out of advertisements that were
not, in whole or in part, developed by Backpage. Although the
majority opinion reasoned that Backpage’s specific content
requirements might essentially constitute “material contributions”
to the content, there is no basis for this conclusion. Applying the
material contribution test shows that Backpage played no part in
ensuring the creation of unlawful content. Merely hosting content
requirements that prohibit certain content from appearing in
advertisements on a website does not equate to ensuring the
creation of unlawful content, even if those content requirements
were set deceptively. As such, immunity should’ve applied and
J.S.’s claims should have been barred.
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PRACTICE POINTERS
▪

If you are, or your client is, a Washington ICSP avoid
maintaining policies regarding content posted by third
parties on your website.

▪

If you are, or your client is, a Washington ICSP that holds
policies regarding content posted by third parties on your
website, enforce those policies vigorously.

▪

If you are, or your client is, a Washington ICSP, and you
are sued for harm caused through or by content posted on
your website by a third party, file a motion to dismiss based
on Section 230 immunity, and cite this Article.

